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STATElVIENT OF THE CASE
Nature of The Case
The Plaintiff/Appellant ("Workman"), a pro se incarcerated inmate, appeals the District
Court's Order on Appeal ("Order") affirming the magistrate's decision to grant the motions to
dismiss/for summary judgment filed by Defendant/Respondent Christopher Rich, Ada County Clerk
("Rich"), and Defendant/Respondent Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"). In essence,
Workman argued the garnishments made by IDOC pursuant to LC. § 20-209H were illegal as his
restitution was no longer "still owing" as the restitution order was a civil judgment, and as such had
expired by operation of Idaho Code§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111. (R., p.321). The Magistrate Court
granted Rich and IDOC's motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or alternatively Rule 56(c),
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (R., pp.199-215). The facts of the case are not in dispute in
this appeal. At issue on appeal are matters oflaw.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Workman is presently incarcerated within the IDOC by virtue of a judgment of conviction
and order of commitment arising out of his guilty plea to aggravated driving under the influence in
Ada County, Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court described the facts underlying his criminal
conviction:
In 2001, Workman drove his vehicle off Interstate 84 and into two pickup trucks
parked on the side of the road. At the time of the crash, Workman was under the
influence of heroin, methamphetamine and THC. The owners of the trucks were
standing between the vehicles at the time of the crash, and both suffered serious
injuries. One person was thrown into the road and suffered major broken bones and
a ruptured spleen. The other person was pinned between the vehicles, breaking one
leg while the other was severed from his body.
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,521, 164 P.3d 798,801 (2007).
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Following entry of the judgment of conviction, the trial court entered an order for restitution on
April 28, 2003. (R., pp.81-82). Workman was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of
$32,391.44, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. The Order for Restitution and Civil Judgment
("Restitution Order") stated, "FURTHER, this order shall constitute a Civil Judgment against the
defendant, KENNETH M. WORKMAN." (R., p.82).
IDOC began deducting funds from Workman's inmate account on September 30, 2003. (R.,
p.78). These deductions from Workman's inmate account have continued, with a total of 33
deductions being made between September 30, 2005, and February 9, 2016. (R., pp.78-79). These
funds were sent to the clerk of the district court in which Workman was convicted (R., p.78), in this
case Defendant Rich, for distribution to the victims identified by the trial court.
Procedural History
Respondent IDOC does not dispute the procedural history set forth in Section LB. of the
Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), with the following exceptions: the Supplemental
Declaration of Kenneth "Mike'' Workman was filed on April 15, 2016; the reply memoranda
filed by Rich on March 25, 2016, and IDOC on April 22, 2016, which were omitted from the
Appellant's Brief; Workman filed his Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2016, which was omitted
from Appellant's Brief; and the District Court filed his Opinion on Appeal on November 16,
2016. Appellant's Brief, pp.1-4.
Workman filed his Appellant's Brief on or about April 27, 2017, and IDOC now files this
responsive brief.
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ISSUES
Workman has asserted one issue on appeal as follows:
Do restitution orders imposed under I.C. § 19-5403 constitute civil money judgments
which must be timely renewed or become expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no
longer still owing?

Appellant's Brief, p.5.
IDOC wishes to rephrase the issue as follows:
Should this Court affirm the District Court's Opinion on Appeal as the Court correctly
determined that Idaho permits collection of orders of restitution separate and aside from
the collection provisions set forth in Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111, and
Defendants Rich and IDOC correctly complied with their statutory authority and
obligations?

ARGUMENT
A. Introduction.
Workman erroneously contends, as he has throughout these proceedings, "At issue in this
appeal is the question of whether the same doctrine[, unenforceability of an expired civil money
judgment,] applies to restitution orders - the same restitution orders that Idaho's appellate courts
have repeatedly held are essentially civil judgments .... " Appellant's Brief, p.8. Contrary to this
assertion, under Idaho law, restitution orders are not just civil judgments subject to the collection
mechanisms set forth in Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111. Rather, Idaho law permits
collection of restitution by victims of crime, through the exercise of civil collection efforts, or by
the Court through other efforts. Because IDOC has the authority, and the obligation, to garnish
Workman's inmate account to remit funds to the district court, I.C. § 29-209H, the District Court
correctly affirmed the Magistrate Court's decision to dismiss Workman's civil complaint.
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B. Standard of Review
Idaho's appellate courts have identified the standard of review to be applied on appeal
from a decision of the district court rendered in its appellate capacity:
We directly review decisions by the district court, rendered in its appellate
capacity. We examine the magistrate record for substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and to determine whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are
so supp.orted and the conclusions flow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed
the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court as a matter of procedure.

State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 335, 337, 209 P.3d 196, 198 (Ct.App. 2009) (citing State v. DeWitt,
145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct.App. 2008)). "The interpretation of a statute is a
question oflaw over which this Court exercises free review." Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 6364, 294 P.3d 184, 189-90 (2013) (quoting New Phase Invs., LLC v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho 207, 209,
280 P.3d 710, 712 (2012)).
C.

Because the District Court Correctly Determined that Idaho Law Authorizes the IDOC to
Garnish an Incarcerated Offender's Restitution Obligation and Remit the Same to the
Clerk of the District Court in which Said Offender was Sentenced, This Court Should
Affirm the District Court's Order on Appeal.
In his Complaint, Workman claimed that, pursuant to Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-

1111, a judgment must be renewed within five (5) years to remain enforceable. 1 (R., p.9).
Therefore, the Restitution Order entered against him expired on April 28, 2008, as it had not
been renewed. (R., p.9). Finally, Workman contends the IDOC illegally garnished funds from his
inmate account.
Before the magistrate, Rich and IDOC argued Workman failed to distinguish between a
criminal restitution order and a civil judgment. (R., pp.53, 75). Rich and IDOC have repeatedly

1

Idaho Code § 10-1110 was amended during the 2015 Legislative Session to specify a lien from an order of
restitution continues for twenty (20) years. See 2015 Session Laws, ch. 139, § 1 and ch. 278, § 4. Idaho Code§ 101111 was amended during the 2016 Legislative Session to extend the time to continue a renewed judgment from five
(5) years to ten (10) years. See 2016 Session Laws, ch. 269, § 1. These amendments do not impact this case.
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reiterated that just because the victim of a crime may file the restitution order as a civil judgment,
and pursue civil collection efforts, does not mean "all restitution orders are civil judgments." (R.,
pp.55; 75; 275; 291-293).
In reaching its decision, the Magistrate Court reviewed Idaho Code §§ 19-5304(4), 195305, 19-4708, and 20-209H, and found restitution may be paid to the victim by court order
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304 or by a civil judgment pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(1).
(R., pp.213-214). The magistrate specifically found Workman's reliance on Idaho Code §§ 101110 and 10-1111 was not "applicable to the situation here, which involves a court order of
restitution being utilized as a basis for garnishing a portion of his prisoner account, not the
execution of a civil judgment." (R., p.213, n.20).
The District Court reviewed the magistrate's order, considered Workman's arguments,
and rejected them. The District Court concluded, "[T]he restitution statute is silent concerning
the expiration of an order of restitution, rather, stating it 'shall be due and owing at the time of
sentencing or at the date the amount ofrestitution is determined, whichever is later."' (R., p.319).
The District Court also stated, "[N]one of [the cases cited by Workman] hold that all restitution
orders are civil judgments and none of them hold that all restitution orders are civil judgments
that must be renewed or they become uncollectible or unenforceable." (R., p.320). Finally, the
District Court held, "This Court agrees with the magistrate that neither I. C. §§ 10-1110 nor 10). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ·
1111 are applicable." (R., p.321~
The District Court's decision affirming the magistrate court's interpretation and
application of the relevant statutes was not in error. The two avenues by which restitution may be
collected, set forth in Idaho Code §§ 19-4708, 19-5305 and 20-209H and identified by the
Magistrate Court, are not mutually exclusive. As explained by the magistrate, simply because an
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order for restitution may also be recorded as a civil judgment does not mean the court order
becomes unenforceable and only the civil judgment may be pursued. (R., p.214). Yet, Workman
continues to erroneously claim that Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 are applicable because a
court order of restitution in a criminal case is essentially a civil judgment, and solely enforceable
as such. Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.
Workman implicitly admits the function of collecting restitution is left either to the
victim or the clerk of the court. Appellant's Brief, p.16. However, he fails to recognize the victim
and the clerk of the court have different mechanisms governed by separate and distinct processes
set forth in statute through which collection efforts may be undertaken. As the Magistrate Court
determined, and the District Court affirmed, the reliance on the court order of restitution by the
clerk of the court and IDOC to collect restitution does not invoke the procedures set forth in
Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 or 10-1111. The legislature specifically established separate avenues by
which the clerk of the court and the victim may collect restitution that is owed. See State v.

Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 172, 345 P.3d 226, 231 (Ct.App. 2014) (the function of enforcing a
restitution order is "specifically entrusted" to the victim pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) or
the clerk of the court pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-5305(2)).
Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) allows the victim to "execute as provided by law for civil
judgments." See State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 397, 271 P.3d 1243, 1253 (Ct.App. 2012)
("[T]he victim may enforce the restitution award like any civil judgment, outside and
independent of the criminal court'\ Idaho Code§ 19-5305(2) provides the clerk of the court may
collect restitution on behalf of the victim as provided in Idaho Code§ 19-4708. The clerk of the
court was not the victim in the underlying criminal case and therefore is not bound by Idaho
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Code § 19-5305(1). 2 The fact that Idaho's statutory scheme provides two mechanisms for
enforcement of restitution orders imposed in criminal cases is not unique to restitution orders.
See, e.g., Grazer, 154 Idaho at 64, 294 P.3d at 190 ("A foreign-judgment creditor holding a

judgment from a sister state or federal court may domesticate the judgment in Idaho in two ways:
by pursuing an action on the judgment, or by filing it in Idaho pursuant to the [Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act]"). Idaho's legislature clearly decided that restitution to victims of
criminal offenses should be fully compensated. Furthermore, restitution is just different than
other civil debts and judgments. See State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 943, 935 P.2d 201, 206
(Ct.App. 1997) (a restitution order is part of a criminal judgment and not simply the creation of a
debt, so it is not affected by a bankruptcy); State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 815-816, 932 P.2d
936, 938-939 (Ct.App. 1997) (restitution orders assist victims collect monies owed them, but
also serve other purposes of sentencing - protecting public safety by providing consequences for
an offender's criminal conduct, forcing the offender to take responsibility for the harm he
caused, and deterring the offender and others by "exacting a 'price' for the crime").
Unlike the requirements imposed on creditors seeking to enforce civil judgments, neither
Idaho Code §§ 19-4708 nor 19-5305(2) requires the clerk of the court to take any steps to
execute the restitution order entered as a result of criminal conduct. Instead, any collection
efforts by the clerk of the court are to be undertaken in the same manner or fashion as other
"debts owed to courts" as provided in Idaho Code§ 19-4708. See I.C. § 19-5305(2). The recently
enacted Idaho Code § 20-209H, which authorizes the IDOC to garnish 20% of funds in an
inmate's trust account to be paid to the clerk of the court for restitution, provides the clerk of the

2

Idaho Code § 19-5306(5)(a) defines "victim" as "an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial
or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a crime or juvenile offense."
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court with another avenue to collect restitution on behalf of the victim. 3 These statutes support
the District Court's conclusion that the execution processes for civil judgments, which the
victims would have to follow if they chose to pursue civil collection efforts on their own, are not
applicable to the clerk of the court when collecting restitution pursuant to an order for restitution.
Idaho Code § 20-209H only requires that restitution be ordered pursuant to Idaho Code § 195304 and, like Idaho Code§ 19-4708, that debt must still be owing.
It is undisputed that Workman has not satisfied his obligation to pay the restitution in full,
The restitution and restitution-specific collection statutes do not impose any time restrictions on
the clerk of the court or the IDOC to fulfill the statutory obligations imposed therein. See

Weaver, 158 Idaho at 172, 345 P.3d at 231 (holding the clerk of the district court is authorized to
determine how and when a restitution order is collected). Further, to allow the clerk of the court
to collect restitution on behalf of the victim in the same manner as other debts owed to the court
supports the long-standing policy of "favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer
economic loss" and to "obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and inconvenience of a
separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their losses." Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 397,
271 P.3d at 1543 (citations omitted).
The statutory language ofldaho Code§§ 19-5304(4), 19-5305, 19-4708, and 20-209H is
not ambiguous. Workman has not provided any legal basis to conclude the District Court
improperly interpreted or applied these statutes to the issue before it. W orlanan does not provide
any argument that the District Court's interpretation of the the statutes based upon the plain,
usual and ordinary meaning of the words used produced a "palpably absurd" result. Twin Lakes
Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 219-220, 254 P.3d 1210, 1215-1216 (2011). The statutes

3

Idaho Code§ 20-209H was added during the 2014 Legislative Session and was effective March 1, 2015. See 2014
Session Laws, ch. 150, § 6.
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governing the collection efforts by the clerk of the court pursuant to a court order of restitution
unambiguously do not require the clerk of the court or the IDOC to utilize the execution methods
for civil judgments, including any requirement to renew said Restitution Order.
Additionally, Workman misapprehends the nature of his financial obligation. Workman
has made little inroad into compensating the two victims to whom he caused great harm due to
his criminal conduct. He seeks to relieve himself of his responsibilities by focusing on alleged
deficits in the victims' and Rich's actions rather than his criminal acts which resulted in
significant harm and financial loss. Furthermore, even if a lien to enforce restitution was
required, and said lien expired, the judgment itself would not have expired. Grazer, 154 Idaho
58, 65 294, P.3d 184, 191 (2013) (citing G & R Petroleum, Inc. v. Clements, 1127 Idaho 199,
121,898 P.2d 50, 52 (1995)) (emphasis added). The mechanism of a judgment lien is "purely the
creation of the statute. Such a lien did not exist at common law." Platts v. Pacific First Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n of Tacoma, 62 Idaho 340, _ , 111 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1941). "Expiration

of the lien of a judgment does not extinguish the judgment. It simply terminates the statutory
security." Id. at 1096. The relevance - title will not be quieted "unless the debt is paid, even
though the mortgage could not be affirmatively enforced." Id. (Givens, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part). "There can be a debt without a lien but there can be no lien without a debt,

because the lien is merely to secure or enforce payment, perforce payment of the debt." Id. at
1097 (Givens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Based on these long-standing
principles, Workman's financial obligation to his victims continues-there can be no dispute that
his restitution obligation is "still owing" as required by Idaho Code§§ 19-4708 and 20-209H.
For the first time on appeal, Workman appears to argue that Idaho Code §§ 19-4708 and
19-5305(2) do not apply to him and his restitution order because the statutes were amended in
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2009 to clarify 1) that the clerk could take action to collect restitution on behalf of victims, and
2) that restitution is a debt owed to the court. Appellant's Brief, p. l 6. This Court should disregard
Workman's argument raised for the first time in this appeal. Idaho appellate courts will not
consider on appeal issues that were not presented to the trial court. Breeden, 129 Idaho at 816,
932 P2d at 939 (citing State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488,490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); State v.
Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662, 889 P.2d 93, 96 (Ct.App. 1995); State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114,

117, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct.App. 1991)). Furthermore, to the extent that Workman contends
that application of these statutory enforcement mechanisms to his ongoing financial obligations
violates some sort of ex post facto prohibition, his argument fails.
In addressing application of the ex post facto prohibition, the Idaho Supreme Court
stated, "In order to determine whether a law is penal in nature for purposes of ex post facto
analysis, this Court must conduct a two-part inquiry. First, we determine whether the legislature
has indicated, either expressly or impliedly, a preference for the statute to be labeled civil or
criminal. 'Second, where [the legislature] has indicated an intention to establish a [civil
regulatory scheme], [the court] inquires further whether the statutory scheme [is] so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention."' Wheeler v. Idaho Dep 't of Health &
Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 262, 207 P.3d 988, 993 (2009) (citations omitted). The collection

mechanisms set forth in Idaho Code §§ 19-4708, 19-5305(2) and 20-209H clearly do not invoke
criminal jurisprudence to enforce restitution orders. Rather, they involve collection of an ongoing financial responsibility flowing from criminal conduct. Even if the procedures are new,
nothing proscribes the legislature's ability to create additional enforcement mechanisms to
collect on a valid debt. Arguably, the legislature, recognizing that the victim's rights act clearly
provided the court with authority to impose restitution liability and that courts have
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"constitutional, statutory and inherent authority to compel obedience with their lawful orders", In
re Weick, 142 Idaho 275,278, 127 P.3d 178, 181 (2005), decided to provide an explicit statutory

procedure for the court to enforce said orders. The legislature complied with its clearly
appropriate constitutional authority. For these reasons, Workman's claim that the statutory
modifications do not apply to him fails.
CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Court correctly concluded the collection efforts by Rich and the IDOC
pursuant to the restitution order entered against Workman are not governed by the execution
processes as provided by law for civil judgments, including the requirement to renew the judgment
under Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111. The District Court correctly affirmed the magistrate's
dismissal of the Workman's civil complaint against IDOC because IDOC had statutory authority
to collect funds from Workman's inmate account and remit them to Rich, the Clerk of the
District Court in and for Ada County, who had the responsibility to pay the same to the victims
of Workman's crime. Accordingly, IDOC respectfully requests that the Court affirm the District
Court's Order on Appeal.
DATED this 23rd day of June 2017.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE TTORNEY G NERAL

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of June 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Respondent IDOC's Brie/by the following method to:
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342
ISCI
P.O. Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83 707

Ray J. Chacko, Deputy Prosecutor
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Counsel for Defendant Rich

[2J U.S. Mail/Inmate Mail Service

D Hand Delivery
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
[2J U.S. Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
[2J

D
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